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663 
Chevron’s Pure Questions: 
Searching for Meaning in Ambiguity 
The danger of Chevron is that it invites courts to ignore 
the fact that Congress decided some things because it did 
not decide everything. 
—Michael Herz1 
Since implied congressional intent is the basis for the Chevron 
doctrine, courts cannot simply presume that Congress intends all 
unclear statutes to signal deference to agencies. Instead, courts must 
make some inquiry into whether that rationale remains true under the 
particular circumstances. This Note contends, then, that the Chevron 
framework, from the outset, asks the wrong question. Instead of 
inquiring whether the statute is clear, courts should determine whether 
Congress intended courts to defer to an agency on the question of 
statutory interpretation. Instinctively deferring to an agency in the face 
of every ambiguity undermines congressional intent. While implied 
congressional intent is difficult to definitively ascertain in any 
particular circumstance, courts should nonetheless determine whether 
the question is one on which Congress is likely to wish courts to defer. The 
Note continues that, in attempting to approximate congressional intent 
regarding deference, the Chevron doctrine could significantly 
improve  how effectively the doctrine shadows congressional intent by 
distinguishing between two types of statutory uncertainty, vagueness 
and ambiguity, two concepts courts have thus far conflated. When a 
court is faced with a lexical or syntactic ambiguity, the court should not 
defer to the agency. Courts should embrace their responsibility as experts 
in interpreting the law because when a provision is ambiguous rather 
than vague, Congress would prefer courts to follow the best reading 
of  the words it enacted rather than following an agency’s 
permissible construction. 
 
 1.  Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking 
Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 220 (1992). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron v. Natural 
Resource Defense Council, a bedrock principle in administrative law 
has been that courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.2 This deference doctrine has 
enormous consequences for the administrative state because courts 
decide whether Chevron applies to a particular case, and, if deference 
is due, the agency wins a significant amount of the time.3 A recent 
 
 2.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 3.  Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 6 (2017) (“[A]gencies won significantly more in the circuit courts when Chevron 
deference applied, at least when the court expressly considered whether to apply Chevron. 
Indeed, there was nearly a twenty-five percentage-point difference in agency-win rates with 
Chevron deference (77.4%) than without (53.6%).”). Significantly, while Chevron deference is 
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study shows that agencies prevail in 77.4% of cases in which 
the  court applies Chevron, compared to 38.5% of cases in 
which  the  court reviews the agency’s interpretation de novo.4 This 
strongly suggests that whether Chevron applies to a particular agency 
interpretation is one of the most decisive aspects of a court’s 
determination when an agency’s statutory construction is at issue. 
Considering that the Chevron determination acts as the 
dispositive issue in many cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has a charge 
to ensure the doctrine proves well founded. The Court has rested 
the deference doctrine on legislative intent—the assumption that 
Congress intends to delegate primary interpretive authority to 
agencies when it leaves an aspect of the statute ambiguous. 
Accordingly, if congressional intent forms Chevron’s basis, the 
Supreme Court should ensure the doctrine truly approximates when 
Congress intends agencies to be the all-but-final arbiter. 
Given the significance of the Chevron determination and the 
reality that administrative agencies leverage Chevron when 
interpreting statutory texts, the proper application (and even 
legitimacy) of the doctrine prompts strong feelings.5 Scholars 
continually debate whether courts should continue to defer to 
agencies in this manner. One side argues that statutes delegating 
authority to federal agencies “are different from the rest” and 
agencies’ statutory constructions deserve deference.6 These scholars 
contend that courts interpreting regulatory statutes in the same way 
 
sporadically applied in the Supreme Court, the doctrine in the circuit courts is different. 
Professors Barnett and Walker show that circuit courts apply the doctrine more often than the 
Supreme Court and uphold agency action under de novo review only 38.5% of the time rather 
than the Supreme Court’s 66.0%. Id.; cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The 
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from 
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1124–25 (2008). 
 4.  Barnett & Walker, supra note 3. 
 5.  As one scholar has put it, Chevron has been debated so extensively that, 
“[a]lthough the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. is nearly eighteen years old—an age at which most humans are reaching 
adulthood and most judicial doctrines are becoming settled—Chevron is in the throes of a 
prolonged, difficult, and confused adolescence.” Russell L. Weaver, The Emperor Has No 
Clothes: Christensen, Mead and Dual Deference Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 173 
(2002) (footnote omitted). 
 6.  See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 550 (2009) 
[hereinafter Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake] (arguing that Chevron needs reform but deference 
to administrative agencies is proper). 
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they do other statutes would be tantamount to creating federal 
common law. Alternatively, critics of Chevron quote Chief Justice 
Marshall’s admonition that “[i]t is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”7 Separation-
of-powers concerns arise when courts abnegate their interpretive 
responsibility, allowing agencies to interpret and enforce statutes 
with only inconsequential judicial oversight.8 
Both sides correctly identify the issues, but each overstates its 
case. Under certain circumstances, a court purporting to interpret an 
unclear statute would be doing little more than picking the best 
policy and dressing it up as statutory interpretation. But there are 
other cases in which a court should not defer even though the 
current Chevron doctrine demands deference. In circumstances in 
which a court can interpret a statutory text in an objective manner, 
the court is in the best position to act as the primary interpreter of 
the text. This aspect of the Note, at least, is not novel—though it is 
controversial and not well settled. 
For instance, since the Chevron opinion in 1984, the Court has 
cut back on the number of situations in which Chevron applies, 
concluding that Congress cannot possibly intend agencies to resolve 
all ambiguities. In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court found that 
Chevron deference attaches only “when it appears that Congress 
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying 
the force of law” (i.e., when the agency used sufficiently formal 
 
 7.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see, e.g., Weaver, supra 
note 5, at 180 (explaining the common critique that “Marbury and the APA are important 
because they recognize that our governmental system involves checks and balances, and part of 
that ‘checking’ function involves judicial review of administrative interpretations”). 
 8.  Then-Judge Gorsuch succinctly and persuasively explained the common separation 
of powers problems inherent in the Chevron Doctrine: 
What would happen, for example, if the political majorities who run the legislative 
and executive branches could decide cases and controversies over past facts? They 
might be tempted to bend existing laws, to reinterpret and apply them retroactively 
in novel ways and without advance notice. Effectively leaving parties who cannot 
alter their past conduct to the mercy of majoritarian politics and risking the 
possibility that unpopular groups might be singled out for this sort of 
mistreatment—and raising along the way, too, grave due process (fair notice) and 
equal protection problems. 
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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procedures to warrant deference).9 In another line of cases, the 
Court has held that Congress cannot have intended agencies to 
decide a question of “deep economic and political significance that is 
central to th[e] statutory scheme.”10 Given these exceptions, might 
there be additional circumstances currently covered by Chevron in 
which Congress does not intend to grant primary interpretive 
authority to an agency? 
The Mead opinion took a critical step forward in acknowledging 
that Congress does not always intend courts to defer to agencies. 
And the Court pivoted the analysis, at least initially, to whether there 
is evidence that Congress indeed intended deference. The opinion 
does not go far enough, however, because if an agency can clear the 
procedural hurdle, then the Court applies Chevron as usual.11 Yet 
there are cases where the statute is genuinely ambiguous—meaning 
that more than one plausible interpretation exists—but where 
Congress likely meant for only one of those meanings to operate. In 
other words, there are statutes that have one correct interpretation. 
The Supreme Court encountered just such a situation only a few 
years after issuing the Chevron opinion.12 In Immigration & 
Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court grappled with 
the interpretation of two provisions allowing refugees to seek asylum 
in the United States.13 Although the textual language was unclear, 
Justice Stevens, also the author of Chevron, refused to defer to the 
 
 9.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 230 (2001) (contending that 
Congress only intends administrative deference when agencies promulgate regulations with the 
effect of law, and “[i]t is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative 
action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure 
tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of 
such  force”). 
 10.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 19, 20 (2010) (“In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court and various courts of 
appeals have declined to afford deference to agency interpretations when an agency’s proposed 
interpretation relies on an insufficiently definite statutory provision in order to greatly increase 
the agency’s power—even in situations that would seem to suggest statutory ambiguity and 
would thus warrant Chevron deference.”). 
 11.  Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 6, at 563 (contending that “[b]ecause 
Mead gives way to Chevron in routine cases, it does not go far enough to alter the standard 
search for statutory meaning”). 
 12.  See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
 13.  Id. 
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agency’s interpretation because the question was “a pure question of 
statutory construction for the courts to decide.”14 According to the 
majority, Cardoza-Fonseca was an instance in which Congress 
intended one specific answer, and thus the Court impliedly 
created  an exception to Chevron for “pure question[s] of 
statutory construction.”15  
Justice Scalia wrote an animated concurrence, contending that 
Chevron deference applied.16 Justice Scalia lost the battle, but he 
ultimately won the war: the Supreme Court’s burgeoning exception 
to Chevron died before it could fully develop.17 One probable reason 
why the “pure questions” doctrine never took hold is that the Court 
never “define[d] precisely what a ‘pure question’ is.”18 
While I do not presume to know exactly what Justice Stevens 
had in mind when he authored Cardoza-Fonseca,19 this Note 
attempts to lay out a method by which courts can determine if the 
statutory provision has a specific meaning and determine if Congress 
likely intended a court to defer. The Note attempts to clarify the 
“pure questions” exception to Chevron by illustrating and defending 
two closely related circumstances when courts should not defer to an 
agency because the issue is one of pure statutory interpretation. 
Courts should distinguish between different types of textual 
uncertainty because not all unclear statutes suffer from the same 
malady. Specifically, courts should not defer when confronted with 
an issue of lexical or syntactic ambiguity. Courts should hesitate 
before deferring in the face of lexical or syntactic ambiguity because, 
though the statute may be unclear and the answer difficult to 
determine, the linguistic properties of the words indicate that 
Congress likely had one meaning in mind. Alternatively, courts 
ought to defer when the statute is vague—when attempting to 
 
 14.  Id. at 446. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 453–55 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 17.  See Herz, supra note 1, at 222. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Indeed, my proposed examples of pure questions of statutory interpretation differ 
greatly from the question presented in Cardoza-Fonseca. Justice Stevens likely thought of the 
exception as one in which congressional intent signaled that only one answer was possible 
while my proposed exception relies on textual clues to determine whether only one answer 
is possible. 
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“interpret” the statute amounts to no more than the creation of 
federal common law. 
The first instance of pure statutory construction occurs when a 
court confronts lexical ambiguity. Lexical ambiguity arises when it is 
unclear which of two or more meanings applies to the situation.20 An 
often-used example is the word bank,21 which has two noticeably 
distinct senses: one referring to a financial institution and the other 
referring to a riverbank.22 When a person says, “I’m headed to the 
bank,” the phrase could lead to two completely different 
understandings depending on if the individual has a paddle or a 
cashier’s check in hand.  
A more conceptually difficult example is the multi-sense meaning 
of door.23 Used one way the word refers to a physical object, usually 
wooden and rectangular, that a person can knock on or open. 
Another way English speakers use door refers to the space between 
the doorframe where people or objects may move.24 We occasionally 
use doorway to refer to this second meaning. When a person says, 
“Guess who just knocked on the door?” or “Guess who just walked 
through the door?” that person is actually expressing two distinct 
senses of the same word. But, as used in these two example 
questions, people rarely recognize the distinction. This, therefore, is 
an example of a possible lexical ambiguity in which the distinction 
between the senses is finely grained25 and is the type of statutory 
 
 20.  Justice Scalia defines this as “[a]n uncertainty of meaning based not on the scope of 
a word or phrase but on a semantic dichotomy that gives rise to any of two or more quite 
different but almost equally plausible interpretations.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 425 (2012); cf. VICTORIA FROMKIN 
ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE 550 (8th ed. 2007) (defining lexical ambiguity as 
“[m]ultiple meanings of sentences due to words that have multiple meanings”). 
 21.  See, e.g., Brendan S. Gillon, Ambiguity, Generality, and Indeterminacy: Tests and 
Definitions, 85 SYNTHESE 391, 404 (1990); ADAM SENNET, AMBIGUITY, THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2016 ed.), https://plato.stan
ford. edu/archives/spr2016/entries/ambiguity/. 
 22.  See Gillon, supra note 21, at 404 (noting that “the lexical ambiguity of words such 
as ‘bank’ cannot be ignored”). 
 23.  JEAN AITCHISON, WORDS IN THE MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MENTAL 
LEXICON 175 (Wiley-Blackwell, 4th ed. 2012) (1987). 
 24.  Id. (noting that “[t]his has been called complementary ambiguity, since door refers 
to different aspects of the same object”). 
 25.  Id. Professor Aitchison explains that words “multiply, like ever-splitting amoebas, as 
new meanings creep in alongside older ones. ‘Meanings expand their range 
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question that might come before a court. The word has two distinct 
meanings, but those meanings are so closely related that they 
are  often conflated—though only one sense operates in any 
given context. 
The second instance of pure statutory construction involves 
syntactic (or structural) ambiguity. This type of ambiguity arises 
when the structure of the sentence creates uncertainty regarding its 
meaning, leading to questions about the relationship between 
particular words or clauses.26 One example of syntactic ambiguity is 
found in the sentence, “The boy saw the man with a telescope.”27 It 
is unclear from the sentence structure alone whether the boy or the 
man held the telescope.28 The structure of the sentence calls into 
question the relationship between the clauses and creates uncertainty 
in the overall interpretation.29 
Lexical and syntactic ambiguity are distinct from and should be 
contrasted with vagueness, with vague provisions receiving 
administrative deference. The most well-known example of 
vagueness comes from H.L.A. Hart’s hypothetical statute that 
prohibits taking “a vehicle into the public park.”30 Professor Hart 
inquired whether the statute should be interpreted to include 
bicycles, toy automobiles, or airplanes.31 The question is not which 
of the two meanings of vehicles applies in this circumstance; rather, 
the issue is whether a particular object falls within the definition of 
“vehicle.”32 In other words, this hypothetical would require the 
court to determine the core characteristics of a vehicle, as the word is 
 
through  the  development of various polysemies . . . these polysemies may be regarded as 
quite fine-grained.’” Id. (quoting PAUL J. HOPPER & ELIZABETH C. TRAUGOTT, 
GRAMMATICALIZATION 100 (1993)). 
 26. FROMKIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 561. “Structural ambiguity: The phenomenon in 
which the same sequence of words has two or more meanings that is accounted for by different 
phrase structure analysis.” Id. 
 27.  See id. at 176–77. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 607 (1958). 
 31.  Id. Professor Hart remarks that “[p]lainly this forbids an automobile, but what 
about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? Are these, as we say, to be 
called ‘vehicles’ for the purpose of the rule or not?” Id. 
 32.  Id. 
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used in the statute, and to determine whether a particular object 
shares enough of those characteristics to be considered a vehicle. 
These types of decisions should receive administrative deference 
because determining, for instance, whether “vehicle” includes a 
stationary World War II memorial with a military truck set on a 
pedestal33 has an air of policymaking. 
While this Note’s narrow objective is to specifically identify 
lexical and syntactic ambiguity as examples of pure questions, more 
broadly the Note attempts to demonstrate that Chevron step one 
asks the wrong question. Instead of inquiring whether the statute is 
clear, courts should ask whether the text suggests that Congress 
intended the provision to have a specific meaning. When courts 
inquire only into whether the statute is clear, they ignore the fact 
that many statutory provisions have actual meaning but, for whatever 
reason—likely that the members of Congress did not catch the 
ambiguity—the provision is susceptible to multiple interpretations. 
To instinctively defer to an agency in the face of every ambiguity 
undermines congressional intent, the foundation upon which 
Chevron sits.34 
This Note proceeds in three parts. After describing the Chevron 
framework, Part I explains why the doctrine needs a broader 
exception than provided for in Mead. Because Chevron bases its 
legitimacy on implied congressional intent, the Court has created a 
legal fiction both by holding that Congress intends courts to defer 
whenever there is an unclear statute and by failing to make any 
inquiry into whether Congress truly intends deference under the 
circumstances. Part II lays out a method by which courts can more 
closely shadow likely congressional intent regarding when courts 
should defer to administrative agencies. It does so by distinguishing 
between two types of statutory uncertainty—ambiguity and 
vagueness. In Part III, the Note makes the case for why the 
distinction between ambiguous and vague statutory provisions makes 
 
 33.  Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 630, 663 (1958) (engaging in Professor Hart’s hypothetical by proposing a difficult 
case, that of a military truck on a pedestal). 
 34.  This assumes that Congress does not wish each and every unclear statutory 
provision to signal administrative deference. This assumption is explored in detail in the 
following Part. 
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sense; specifically, neither the congressional-intent theory nor 
alternative theories such as agency expertise or political 
accountability justify deferring to administrative agencies when the 
statutory provision is lexically or syntactically ambiguous. 
I. WHY AN EXCEPTION TO THE CHEVRON FRAMEWORK 
IS NECESSARY 
The Chevron analytical framework is fairly straightforward, even 
if courts often struggle to apply it consistently.35 Chevron’s 
theoretical foundation, however, is less apparent. Scholars have 
struggled to come to a consensus regarding the judiciary’s basis for 
administrative deference, and many scholars have labeled the 
prevailing rationale—implied congressional intent—a legal fiction.36 
Indeed, accepting the rationale of implied congressional intent, 
which the Court did in Mead, creates problems for Chevron’s 
coherency since Congress does not intend courts to defer in every 
instance. The Court came close to recognizing this incoherency in 
Mead. And its future decisions should more broadly consider 
whether Congress actually intends to delegate to agencies primary 
interpretive authority with every unclear statutory provision. 
This Part addresses why, for the Chevron doctrine to prove 
coherent, it is necessary for courts to ask the broader question of 
when Congress genuinely intends for agencies to resolve ambiguities 
and then for courts to formulate exceptions to administrative 
deference that would help courts to defer only in those 
circumstances. This Part argues that courts should acknowledge that 
Chevron is based on a legal fiction, that courts should defer to 
agencies only under circumstances that reflect when Congress 
actually intends deference, and, thus, that a broader exception than 
Mead is necessary. 
 
 35.  Eskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at 1124–25 (showing that the Supreme Court 
applies Chevron only a quarter of the time where it would seem to apply). 
 36.  See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 203 (2001) (labeling the conclusions drawn about congressional intent 
“fraudulent”); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1285 (2008); 
Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 311 (2011) (noting 
that the Chevron fiction is “unsupportable”). 
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A. Current Chevron Doctrine 
The Chevron decision significantly altered administrative law, but 
in 1984 there was no hint that the case would become a landmark 
decision.37 Only six Justices participated in the case and none 
dissented.38 Additionally, in the year following the Chevron decision, 
the Court decided nineteen cases in which the Chevron framework 
should have applied. Yet the Court cited the opinion only once.39 As 
one scholar has remarked, “Justice Stevens’ opinion contained 
several features that can only be described as ‘revolutionary,’ even if 
no revolution was intended at the time.”40 Although it is difficult to 
pinpoint exactly when Chevron achieved canonical status, it first 
gained importance in the lower courts, and the Supreme Court cited 
it rarely until Justice Antonin Scalia joined the Court in 1986.41 
The Chevron litigation arose out of the Reagan administration’s 
deregulatory agenda.42 The Clean Air Act mandates that states 
establish a program to regulate “major stationary sources” of air 
pollution, but the Act does not define the term.43 The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), reversing course, redefined 
the term to refer to a permit owner’s entire facility rather than a 
single polluting source.44 This policy, known as the “bubble 
concept,”45 reduced the costs of complying with the EPA’s emissions 
standards because, if a stationary source referred to an entire facility, 
 
 37.  Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 
976 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill, Judicial Deference] (“In time . . . lower courts, agencies, and 
commentators all came to regard the analysis of the deference question set forth in Chevron as 
fundamentally different from that of the previous era. Justice Stevens’ opinion contained 
several features that can only be described as ‘revolutionary’ . . . .”). 
 38.  Id. at 975–76. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id.; Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 
283, 284 (1986) (noting that “[t]his revolutionary effect is not apparent from a quick 
examination of the opinion itself”). 
 41.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 
833, 838 (2001). 
 42.  Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 37, at 975 (“[T]he disputed issue could be 
seen as part of the general deregulatory thrust of the early Reagan Administration.”). 
 43.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841 (1984). 
 44.  Id. at 862 (explaining that the EPA’s new interpretation of “stationary source” 
proved a “sharp break with prior interpretations of the Act”). 
 45.  Id. at 841–42. 
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pollution could surge in parts of the facility as long as the increase 
was offset by a decrease within the “bubble.” 
The Chevron opinion upheld the EPA’s new definition because 
“Congress did not actually have an intent regarding the applicability 
of the bubble concept.”46 The Court also devised a novel framework 
under which courts should analyze similar questions. The Court held 
that courts defer to an agency interpretation unless “the issue is 
suitable for independent judicial resolution.”47 Independent judicial 
analysis had been the default rule,48 but the Chevron Court reversed 
the presumption in favor of deference, permitting independent 
judgment only when the statute is unambiguous. The Court 
appeared to jettison the factors courts traditionally relied upon to 
determine whether the case warranted deference49 and instituted a 
procedural framework that, at least facially, is straightforward. 
Traditionally, the Chevron analysis consists of two distinct steps. 
The first step requires the court to determine “whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue”50—whether the 
statutory language is sufficiently clear that only one plausible 
interpretation exists. If the court determines that the statute is 
ambiguous, the court continues to step two. The second step 
instructs the court to determine whether the agency’s interpretation 
is “permissible”—giving broad discretion to the agency to interpret 
the statute according to its understanding of congressional intent, 
unless the agency’s interpretation moves into the realm 
of unreasonableness.51 
A court’s responsibility is to determine if the statute is 
unambiguous because, if so, congressional intent is clear. Chevron 
expressly declares that “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
 
 46.  Id. at 845. 
 47.  Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 37, at 977. 
 48. Id. 
 49. For example, Justice Scalia argued that under Chevron, “there is no longer any 
justification for giving ‘special’ deference to ‘long-standing and consistent’ agency 
interpretations of law.” Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (1989). 
 50. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 51. See id. at 843. 
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effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”52 
Chevron step one is, thus, an all-or-nothing decision whereby the 
court decides whether the statute is clear,53 reasoning that if the 
statute is unclear, Congress would wish the court to grant deference 
to the agency’s interpretation of the specific statutory provision. 
Courts generally determine whether the statute is ambiguous by 
“employing traditional tools of statutory construction.”54 The 
Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of “the statute’s text, its 
context, the structure of the statutory scheme, and canons of textual 
construction” to determine whether a statute is clear at Chevron step 
one.55 The Court has also accepted evidence of “statutory purposes, 
including those revealed in part by legislative and regulatory 
history,” to make a similar determination.56 If a court cannot deduce 
the clear meaning of the statutory provision, it proceeds to Chevron 
step two. 
Step two ensures that a “court does not simply impose its own 
construction on” an ambiguous statute, “as would be necessary in 
the absence of an administrative interpretation.”57 The court’s 
responsibility shifts from finding the best meaning to ensuring that 
the agency’s interpretation is “permissible.” One scholar has 
conceptualized the “permissible” meaning of the statute as a “space” 
within which the agency may operate.58 Unclear terms may have a 
variety of permissible meanings, and the agency is authorized to 
 
 52. Id. at 842–43. 
 53. Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 37, at 977 (“Chevron transformed a regime 
that allowed courts to give agencies deference along a sliding scale into a regime with an 
on/off switch.”). 
 54. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
 55. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 309 (2013). 
 56. Id. at 309–10; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
143–47 (2000). 
 57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also id. at 844 (footnote omitted) (“We have long 
recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s 
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference 
to administrative interpretations . . . .”). 
 58. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” 
and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012). Chevron grants to an agency an 
“area within which [the] administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act in a 
manner that creates legal obligations or constraints—that is, its [delegated or] 
allocated authority.” Id. 
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choose any meaning that is within this space, bounded only by the 
reasonable confines of the disputed term.59 
The second step is more than perfunctory, as the court takes a 
closer look than simply asking whether the interpretation “would 
flunk the laugh test at the Kennedy School of Public Policy.”60 Yet, 
when a court reaches step two, it rarely overturns an agency 
interpretation as impermissible.61 Although courts do not simply 
rubber-stamp any interpretation the agency concocts, the Chevron 
opinion strongly suggests that courts are not “supervisors of 
agencies” but are closer to “a check or bulwark against abuses of 
agency power.”62 Thus, if a statute is truly unclear, the court will give 
significant deference to the agency’s interpretation and will second 
guess the agency only when the court encounters an 
untenable interpretation. 
Thus, the Chevron framework, without proper exceptions, has 
enormous consequence for statutes with lexical or syntactic 
ambiguity because the provision might be difficult to decipher, 
leading the court to declare the provision ambiguous. The court 
would then switch from attempting to find the best meaning of the 
provision to assuring itself that the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable. This creates issues for lexically and syntactically 
ambiguous statutes because linguistically such statutes have only one 
possible answer, but a court might be forced to accept a plausible yet 
incorrect agency construction.63 
 
 
 59. See id. 
 60. Erika Jones et al., Developments in Judicial Review with Emphasis on the Concepts of 
Standing and Deference to the Agency, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 113, 124 (1990) (comments of the Hon. 
Judge Stephen F. Williams) (remarking that the view of Chevron step two as merely an exercise 
in determining whether the agency interpretation passes the laugh test is “a gross overreading 
of Chevron”). 
 61. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in 
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 96 (1994). 
 62. Starr, supra note 40, at 300–01 (“Although the Court has not completely embraced 
the pure checking and balancing paradigm as a normative description of the court-agency 
relationship, and probably never will, Chevron strongly suggests that courts should see 
themselves not as supervisors of agencies, but more as a check or bulwark against abuses of 
agency power.”). 
 63. See infra Section III.B. 
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B. Chevron’s Foundation 
Any theory that purports to create an exception to Chevron must 
square with the rationale behind the doctrine itself. If the exception 
does not further the Chevron doctrine, either the exception is 
unwarranted or the entire doctrine is amiss. Since this Note contends 
that Chevron deference has its place, provided the appropriate 
exceptions apply, the concept that courts should not defer in the face 
of lexical or syntactic ambiguity must also conform to the Court’s 
rationale for creating administrative deference in the first instance. 
This task is not entirely straightforward, however. Scholars 
debate what doctrine or principle grants the Court authority to 
depart from Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition that the authority 
falls to the judiciary “to say what the law is.”64 For instance, most 
scholars admit that the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) offers 
no support for Chevron deference.65 The APA specifies that “the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning 
or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”66 Additionally, the 
statute provides that “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . set aside agency 
action . . . not in accordance with law.”67 
With no support from the APA, the Chevron opinion advanced 
several non-statutory theories about the policy basis of administrative 
deference.68 First, Justice Stevens argued that Congress likely 
intended to delegate certain questions to administrative agencies 
 
 64. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 65. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron 
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 788–94 (2010) 
(explaining that the APA includes provisions that “seem to be relatively clear statements by 
Congress intended to assign resolution of legal issues to reviewing courts, not to administrative 
agencies”); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
113, 189–211 (1998) (arguing that “[t]he legislative history of the APA leaves no doubt that 
Congress thought the . . . [statute] ‘require[d] courts to determine independently all relevant 
questions of law, including the interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions’”); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 196 (2006) (contending that the APA 
“seems to suggest that ambiguities must be resolved by courts and hence that the Chevron 
framework is wrong”). 
 66. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
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because “the regulatory scheme is technical or complex” or because 
“Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the 
question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with 
the scheme devised by the agency.”69 Second, agencies have the 
necessary expertise to decide difficult policy questions that courts 
cannot since “[j]udges are not experts in the field.”70 Third, 
administrative agencies are more politically accountable than courts 
and, thus, in the face of ambiguous statutory text, agencies ought to 
be the institution establishing policy. The opinion reasoned that 
“[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political 
branch of the Government to make such policy choices.”71 
Beyond these theories, scholars have advanced other arguments 
that have received varying degrees of acknowledgment from courts. 
For instance, Peter Strauss contended that Chevron is the Court’s 
method of ensuring national uniformity in federal administrative 
law.72 Because the Supreme Court may review only a small 
percentage of circuit decisions, the Chevron doctrine allows for 
greater national uniformity, counteracting “the balkanization of 
federal law.”73 By granting agencies broad deference, the Chevron 
doctrine reduces the likelihood of circuit splits that could shroud the 
administrative state in uncertainty.74 Cass Sunstein has justified 
deference by emphasizing the executive’s need to react “promptly 
and decisively” in the face of change.75 Professors Goldsmith and 
Manning argue that agencies, being executive branch departments, 
have independent constitutional authority to fill statutory gaps.76 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme 
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 
(1987) [hereinafter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases]; see also id. at 1112 (“Varying 
instructions from different courts of appeals not only interfere with the instruction to achieve 
uniformity, but also make it more difficult for the agency to manage its own resources . . . .”). 
 73. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 
115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2588 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond Marbury]. 
 74. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases, supra note 72, at 1112. 
 75. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 73, at 2587. 
 76. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE 
L.J. 2280, 2297–302 (2006). 
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They urge that “the executive branch presumptively may fill in the 
legislative details unless Congress specifies otherwise.”77 
Despite the proliferation of scholarly theories, the Supreme 
Court has rested its recent decisions on implied congressional intent 
as Chevron’s foundation.78 In Mead, the Court made clear that 
“administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision 
qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress 
delegated authority to the agency.”79 Gone were the references to 
agency expertise and greater democratic accountability, and absent 
were any other scholarly theories about how the Chevron doctrine 
may be defended on alternative grounds.80 
Joining the reasoning in Mead, scholars too have generally 
endorsed implied congressional intent as the basis for Chevron.81 
Two prominent scholars have remarked that the congressional-intent 
theory proves the most persuasive because it “can solve the 
puzzles  about why Chevron deference is mandatory, and why it 
supersedes  the APA . . . . Deference is mandatory because Congress 
has commanded it.”82 Accordingly, implied congressional intent is 
the only theory that seems to fully encompass Chevron’s reasoning. 
Moreover, scholars have argued that the implied-intent theory 
represents how Congress acts. Professor Bressman notes that 
Congress absolutely intends to delegate interpretive authority, at 
least under certain circumstances.83 Her work attempts to rebut the 
critics’ charge “that Congress does not think about delegation of 
 
 77. Id. at 2298. 
 78. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001). 
 79. Id. at 226; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 
(2000); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (noting that Chevron 
depends on the “presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for 
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and 
foremost, by the agency”). 
 80. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226. 
 81. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 73, at 2589 (“[A] consensus has developed 
on an important proposition, one that now provides the foundation for Chevron itself: The 
executive’s law-interpreting power turns on congressional will.”); see Merrill & Hickman, supra 
note 41, at 863–73. 
 82. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 41, at 870. 
 83. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 
VA. L. REV. 2009, 2009 (2011). 
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interpretive authority at all or in the way the Court imagines.”84 She 
writes that an inquiry into how Congress behaves provides 
legitimate  reasons “to believe that the basic presumption of 
congressional  delegation is well grounded” and “to assume that an 
express delegation of regulatory authority generally carries an 
implied delegation of interpretive authority.”85 
Additional scholarship shows that Congress does intend to 
delegate, at least for certain situations. Professors Epstein and 
O’Halloran, for instance, found that Congress delegated more 
policymaking when statutes were complex.86 They argued that 
Congress counts on 535 members and their staff to understand 
policy concerns and to recommend potential legislative solutions, 
whereas the executive branch “is filled (or can be filled) with policy 
experts who can run tests and experiments, gather data, and 
otherwise determine the wisest course of policy.”87 
Since the Supreme Court has generally relied on congressional 
intent and has based its opinions on this theory, this Note assumes 
that Chevron is based on the notion that Congress intends for 
agencies to interpret ambiguous statutory provisions. Despite the 
existence of alternative theories, the Court seems interested only in 
congressional intent and is most likely amenable to restricting the 
doctrine based on arguments that Congress does not intend all 
ambiguities to license agencies to base their policies solely on 
plausible readings of statutory provisions. 
Yet, accepting that Chevron is based on implied congressional 
intent also illustrates the necessity of creating exceptions to the 
doctrine that permit courts to reject deference in instances where 
Congress does not intend deference. For instance, not all 
commentators are prepared to assume that Congress intends judicial 
deference as Chevron commands. Some scholars contend that 
justifying broad agency deference on an implied congressional intent 
 
 84. Id. at 2011. 
 85. Id. 
 86. David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the 
Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 967 (1999). 
 87. Id. 
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is more than a legal fiction—it is a farce.88 Professors Barron and 
Kagan contend that “[i]t is far more likely that Congress, unless 
confronting a serious problem in the exercise of some interpretive 
authority, simply fails to think about this allocation of power 
between judges and agencies.”89 Other critics argue that Congress 
has never enacted a general deference statute, and as Professor 
Merrill points out, Congress’s general “practice of enacting specific 
delegations of interpretative authority suggests that Congress 
understands that no such general authority exists.”90 Professor Farina 
also takes issue with implicit congressional intent as a justification for 
deference because Congress uses similarly expansive language in 
statutory schemes wholly “committed to judicial oversight,” and 
this  “would seem to undermine any notion of some generic 
legislative  disinclination to trust courts with interpreting broad 
statutory mandates.”91 
Indeed, Judge Henry Edwards wrote that simply assuming “that 
silence or ambiguity confers that kind of interpretative authority on 
the agency is unacceptable, for it assumes the very point in issue and 
thus ‘fails to distinguish between statutory ambiguities on the one 
hand and legislative delegations of law-interpreting power to 
agencies on the other.’”92 Presuming that Congress implicitly 
delegates interpretive authority to agencies without evidence of such 
intent, indeed, with evidence to the contrary, does little to support 
the Chevron doctrine. 
 
 88. See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 36, at 203 (labeling the conclusions drawn 
about congressional intent “fraudulent”); Criddle, supra note 36, at 1285; Seidenfeld, supra 
note 36, at 311 (noting that the Chevron fiction is “unsupportable”). 
 89. Barron & Kagan, supra note 36, at 216. 
 90. Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 37, at 995. 
 91. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 471 (1989). Professor Farina writes that “[t]he 
classic example of a broad mandate committed to judicial elaboration and enforcement is the 
Sherman Act’s prohibition of ‘[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade’ and of activities that ‘monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States.’” Id. at 471 n.77 (all but first alteration in original) 
(citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (1982)). 
 92.  CSX Transp. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Clark M. Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of 
Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 261 (1988)). 
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Moreover, current scholarship also proves that Congress does 
not always intend to grant agencies primary interpretive authority in 
the face of ambiguity. Professors Gluck and Bressman recently 
conducted a survey of 137 congressional drafters about doctrines of 
statutory interpretation.93 They conclude that “although ambiguity 
sometimes signals intent to delegate, often it does not.”94 Moreover, 
these drafters were chiefly referring to purposeful ambiguity in 
statutes, not to when “neither side realized the ambiguity that they 
were creating.”95 While an across-the-board presumption of 
congressional intent to delegate this authority could potentially be 
justified if Congress intended agencies to always act as the primary 
interpreters, unintentional ambiguity is the least likely type of 
ambiguity to have an attaching congressional intent. Thus, when the 
ambiguity went unrecognized until an agency began promulgating 
regulations, the fiction that Congress implied a delegated 
interpretive authority proves the weakest. And, Gluck and 
Bressman’s study demonstrates that legislative drafters believe 
Congress does not always intend an agency’s interpretation to 
predominate—even when Congress passes a statute with a 
manifest ambiguity.96 
Thus, it speaks to reason that if there are circumstances in which 
Congress does not intend courts to defer to administrative agencies, 
courts should pay close attention to signals regarding when 
deference is warranted. As such, courts should not merely determine 
whether the statute is clear. Instead, they should inquire further and 
develop doctrines that seek to determine when Congress intends 
 
 93.  Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 901 (2013). Professors Gluck and Bressman surveyed 137 “congressional staffers drawn 
from both parties, both chambers of Congress, and spanning multiple committees—on topics 
ranging from their knowledge and use of the canons of interpretations, to legislative history, 
the administrative law deference doctrines, the legislative process, and the courts-Congress 
relationship.” Id. at 902. 
 94.  Id. at 996. 
 95.  Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative 
Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 872 (2014) (“Avoidable unintentional ambiguity results 
from a lack of attention to detail or a lack of time or resources to resolve ambiguity. One of the 
most prominent examples of an avoidably, but unintentionally, vague statute is the Alien 
Contract Labor Law that was the focus of the seminal Holy Trinity Supreme Court case.”). 
 96.  Gluck & Bressman, supra note 93, at 996. 
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deference and when the judiciary should wield its full reviewing 
authority. The distinction advocated here is for courts to withhold 
deference for pure questions of statutory construction—when the 
disputed provision comprises a lexical or syntactic ambiguity. 
C. Chevron’s Legal Fiction 
A general scholarly consensus has developed, endorsed most 
prominently by the Supreme Court in Mead, that “[t]he executive’s 
law-interpreting power turns on congressional will.”97 This has 
certain implications for when courts should defer to administrative 
agencies. As one scholar has remarked, “The conclusion that 
Chevron rests on an implied delegation from Congress also has 
important implications for Chevron’s domain: it means that Congress 
has ultimate authority over the scope of the Chevron doctrine and 
that courts should attend carefully to the signals Congress sends 
about its interpretative wishes.”98 Courts should defer to agency 
interpretations of statutes only when Congress has expressly or 
impliedly conveyed a desire for such a result. 
Yet, any theory based on implied congressional intent is 
necessarily based on a legal fiction.99 This is so because of the 
difficulty, if not impossibility, of determining in specific 
circumstances when Congress expresses an “implied” desire to 
delegate primary interpretive authority to agencies. As Professors 
 
 97.  Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 73, at 2589; see Merrill & Hickman, supra 
note 41, at 863–73. 
 98.  Merrill & Hickman, supra note 41, at 836. Professors Merrill and Hickman argue 
that the Court has recognized to a certain degree that Chevron deference is not always 
appropriate, and this is why the Court has retained Skidmore deference. 
Recognizing Skidmore as the default alternative to Chevron gives courts three 
choices rather than two in reviewing agency interpretations of statutes. Instead of 
Chevron deference and no deference, we have Chevron deference, Skidmore 
deference, and no deference. This larger menu of options allows Chevron to be 
given a relatively narrow domain, one that hopefully captures those circumstances in 
which deference is most appropriate. 
Id. at 863. 
 99.  Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 73, at 2590 (“But as Justices Breyer and 
Scalia have independently emphasized, this is a legal fiction; usually the legislature has not 
expressly conferred that power at all. The view that the executive may ‘say what the law is’ 
results not from any reading of statutory text, but from a heavily pragmatic construction, by 
courts, of (nonexistent) congressional instructions.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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Barron and Kagan insist, “Given the difficulty of determining actual 
congressional intent, some version of constructive—or perhaps more 
frankly said, fictional—intent must operate in judicial efforts to 
delineate the scope of Chevron.”100 
The fact that Chevron, as it now stands, is built upon a type of 
legal fiction is not its fatal flaw, however. The current doctrine’s 
greatest weakness is that it proves more contradictory in nature than 
a simple legal fiction. It fundamentally misrepresents the analysis 
courts actually engage in when confronted with an agency action. If 
the doctrine is genuinely based on congressional intent to delegate, 
then courts should attempt to determine whether Congress actually 
intended to delegate. Yet, these questions do not enter into the 
Chevron analysis.101 Chevron instructs courts to focus on whether the 
text is clear and, if not, to presume congressional intent to delegate 
regardless of any other factors.102 As Professor Bressman notes, 
Chevron recognizes that Congress may impliedly delegate 
interpretive authority to agencies. “But rather than implementing 
these insights as part of the doctrinal analysis, Chevron reverts to 
the . . . search [for] meaning.”103 
Thus, Chevron correctly notes that Congress may at times intend 
for agencies to authoritatively interpret its statutes, but the doctrine 
does not take into account circumstances under which Congress 
likely intends otherwise. It creates a legal fiction that every 
ambiguous administrative provision gives the agency primary 
interpretive authority. If ambiguous statutes do not always signal 
congressional intent to defer—as this Note contends—courts should 
give special attention to determining when Congress expects the 
judiciary to perform a probing review of agency action. 
Ultimately, Chevron’s legal fiction fails to accomplish its 
purported aim—to approximate congressional intent. And to the 
extent the doctrine does not shadow congressional intent, it is 
disingenuous, “a kind of diversion, allowing judges to exercise 
 
 100.  Barron & Kagan, supra note 36, at 203. 
 101.  Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 6, at 553–54. 
 102.  Id. at 553 (“Chevron recognizes such ‘delegating’ factors; its mistake is failing to 
make those factors central to its doctrinal inquiry. The factors operate only as justifications for 
agency delegation, not as guides for determining the existence of that delegation.”). 
 103.  Id. at 553–54. 
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significant discretion in determining statutory meaning while 
attributing their discretionary choices to Congress.”104 
But not all implied congressional intent theories inevitably suffer 
from a similar flaw. While congressional intent is difficult to 
determine, especially implied intent, this does not necessarily suggest 
that courts cannot create a legal fiction that more closely aligns with 
congressional behavior and intent. Part of any such doctrine must 
include courts’ assessing whether Congress intended administrative 
deference under the specific circumstances. In other words, few 
circumstances will present themselves in which courts can definitively 
say that Congress disfavored deference under the specific statute, but 
courts can provide rules that create exceptions to Chevron under 
circumstances in which Congress is least likely to favor 
administrative deference. 
In this regard, Mead is a step in the right direction. While 
Chevron partially bases its justification on congressional intent, an 
examination of likely congressional intent is absent from the Court’s 
analysis. Conversely, Mead makes legislative intent its central, 
threshold inquiry.105 Mead involved the issue of whether a United 
States Customs Service ruling letter deserved Chevron deference.106 
U.S. Customs issues between 10,000 and 15,000 of these letters 
annually from forty-six separate offices, and letters are issued and 
modified without notice-and-comment procedures.107 The Court 
withheld Chevron deference, reasoning that “there [is] no indication 
that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law.”108 
Mead asserts that Congress does not intend to delegate interpretive 
 
 104.  Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 619 (2002) (“This raises significant 
questions about institutional accountability for legislative law, for it allows judges to use the 
soothing rhetoric of the standard judicial story to distance themselves from their own 
interpretive creations.”). 
 105.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001) (“We have recognized a 
very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional 
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces 
regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”). 
 106.  Id. at 221. 
 107.  Id. at 223, 233 (“[A]ny suggestion that rulings intended to have the force of law 
are being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an agency’s 46 scattered offices is simply 
self-refuting.”). 
 108.  Id. at 221. 
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authority to executive agencies unless the agency has engaged in 
sufficiently formal procedures, “such as notice-and-comment 
rulemaking or formal adjudication.”109 
Though Mead makes its central inquiry whether Congress 
actually intended to delegate, the case proves too little to correct 
Chevron’s error. As Professor Bressman argues, “the Mead opinion 
does not carry the procedural consideration through to its proper 
conclusion.”110 The opinion focuses on the procedure the agency 
undertook to issue the rule, and if it passes the Mead inquiry, the 
Court applies Chevron as usual without undertaking any inquiry into 
other factors, such as whether Congress was likely to have intended 
deference under the particular circumstances.111 “Because Mead gives 
way to Chevron in routine cases, it does not go far enough to alter 
the standard search for statutory meaning.”112 
D. Recent Scholarship on Remedying the Chevron Fiction 
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Chevron, scholars 
began either defending Chevron’s premise or suggesting ways the 
doctrine should be changed to remedy its apparent legal fiction. 
Recent scholarship has largely followed similar lines. But these 
solutions fall short.  
Professor Bressman, for instance, has called for courts to inquire 
whether the statute falls into one of three categories and to weigh 
several factors in determining whether Congress likely intended to 
delegate interpretive authority to an agency.113 In other words, like 
this Note’s proposal, Bressman’s focus is in finding whether 
Congress actually intended to delegate rather than assuming such 
intent by virtue of ambiguity. To do this, she identifies three signals 
that suggest congressional intent to delegate.  
First, Congress is more likely to delegate primary interpretive 
authority to agencies, and thus courts should defer, when the issue is 
 
 109.  Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 6, at 561–62. 
 110.  Id. at 563. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 552–53. 
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complex.114 These statutes would include technical issues “requiring 
both time and expertise. If the statutory provision later to be 
interpreted concerns a technical matter, requiring the acquisition or 
assessment of specialized information, it is likely the sort of subject 
that generalist staffers or legislators are unwilling or unable to 
handle, even with the benefit of outside consultants.”115 
Second, courts should defer to agency interpretations when the 
issue is one where Congress wished to “short-circuit extended 
legislative battles over contentious issues.”116 “A contentious issue is 
one subject to active debate between legislative coalitions, the 
resolution of which in the statute for either side might derail the 
law’s passage.”117 As such, Congress likely delegated broad issues to 
an agency’s discretion when the issue was so contentious that neither 
side could muster a majority.118  
Third, Congress is likely to delegate primary interpretive 
authority when there are adequate procedures in place to “ensure 
that subsequent agency interpretations will roughly track legislative 
preferences. It can use procedures for that purpose or rely on 
positions that the agency has maintained before or taken during the 
course of legislative drafting.”119 
Consistent with her critiques of Chevron’s failures, Professor 
Bressman stresses that courts should not focus on a search for 
specific meaning using any of the traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation.120 According to Bressman, political scientists and legal 
scholars have shown that often Congress does not intend a single 
meaning.121 She argues that textualism “seems to transform statutory 
interpretation into a kind of exercise in judicial ingenuity. The 
textualist judge treats questions of interpretation like a puzzle to 
 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 576–77. 
 116.  Id. at 578. 
 117.  Id. at 578–79. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 583. 
 120.  Id. at 559–67. 
 121.  Id. 
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which it is assumed there is one right answer.”122 She continues that 
“intentionalism and purposivism are still vulnerable to judicial craft 
because they also ask courts to construct a meaning for statutory text 
on the assumption that the text has one right answer.”123 If Congress 
did not intend only one particular meaning, then Chevron’s laser 
focus on the search for a text’s meaning does nothing to help 
determine whether Congress meant to delegate primary interpretive 
authority to agencies. 
Consequently, if Congress had no particular intent regarding the 
issue before the court—the argument goes—the court should stop 
looking for it. This lack of intent could occur because Congress 
could not reach a consensus and therefore inserted vague language 
for agencies to flesh out.124 It could also occur because the subject 
area was overly technical, so Congress gave agencies sweeping 
discretion to transform statutory guidelines into policy outcomes.125 
Bressman’s arguments for how the Court should address 
Chevron’s errors are incomplete, and to the extent they are 
incomplete, they are unpersuasive for at least three reasons. First, the 
notion that Congress always wishes to delegate interpretive authority 
to an agency when the subject matter is technical or when Congress 
inserts unclear language to break a legislative logjam remains as 
much a legal fiction as the one Chevron promotes.  
Always delegating to agencies when issues are either technical or 
require compromise between legislative factions creates the same 
type of legal fiction decried in Chevron; namely, the doctrine 
purports to but does not actually correlate with legislative 
expectations. For instance, in Bressman’s later work with Professor 
Gluck, legislative drafters reported that they try to write clear 
statutes when they have a singular meaning in mind and when they 
do not want agencies to diverge from that meaning.126 “The 
 
 122.  Id. at 564 (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the 
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994)). 
 123.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 124.  Id. at 553 (Congress “likely delegates to avoid contentious issues and obtain 
consensus on legislation”). 
 125.  Id. (Congress “likely delegates to avoid complex issues, which conserves legislative 
resources and capitalizes on agency expertise”). 
 126.  Gluck & Bressman, supra note 93, at 996. 
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presumption is broad deference, so we try to be clear when we want 
otherwise.”127 Thus, if a court finds that the text is clear but 
nonetheless defers to the agency because the statutory material is 
complex and technical, the court would subvert congressional intent. 
Second, even when Congress may not have intended one aspect 
of a particular provision to carry a singular meaning, it does not 
follow that Congress did not intend to convey a singular meaning in 
other provisions or the statute as a whole. For instance, Congress 
may draw up a statute with technical portions but provide other 
provisions that dictate the limits of how an agency may interpret and 
implement those technical provisions. In this way, Professor 
Bressman’s argument would lead courts to repeat Chevron’s failures, 
for, as one scholar has remarked, “The danger of Chevron is that it 
invites courts to ignore the fact that Congress decided some things 
because it did not decide everything.”128 
And, even if the issue before Congress was contentious and 
included “active debate between legislative coalitions”—which 
courts could determine only by “look[ing] to the surrounding 
circumstances”—it does not follow that the disagreement resulted in 
ambiguous language, with “each side decid[ing] to take their 
chances with the scheme devised by the agency.”129 The result could 
have just as plausibly been a horse-trading compromise, resulting in 
each side receiving certain specific, advantageous components of the 
whole. If an agency interpreted the statute as only one legislative 
coalition wished, courts would again subvert congressional intent by 
allowing one coalition to have its cake and eat it too. 
Courts should therefore consider more than complexity and the 
circumstances surrounding the statute’s passage when determining if 
an agency’s interpretation warrants deference. This is especially so 
since Bressman has noted that under her approach, a court would 
infrequently “conclude that a regulatory issue is not so complex as to 
suggest delegation.”130 But despite a statute’s complexity, Congress is 
capable of creating provisions with specific and singular meaning. 
 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Herz, supra note 1, at 220. 
 129.  Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 6, at 578–79 (emphasis omitted). 
 130.  Id. at 577. 
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Congress may, and likely does, tend to grant agencies more authority 
in technical statutes to interpret provisions and to fill in the details of 
certain complex policy issues. This does not mean that the entire 
statute lacks for specific meaning. Thus, the fact that a particular 
provision brims with complexity does not alone give reason to 
delegate. There must be further textual clues that Congress likely 
gave an agency interpretive authority over a particular issue. 
Third, the text of some statutes may bear only one meaning, 
regardless of Congress’s possible intentions to muddle the issue. 
While the legal fiction that Professor Bressman proposes may 
correctly predict that Congress is more likely to delegate under 
certain circumstances, her solution is at least incomplete and thus 
inadequate to approximate when Congress is likely to intend to 
delegate primary interpretive authority to an agency. 
Thus, the Chevron doctrine rests on a legal fiction that courts 
and scholars have failed to remedy. Granted, Congress probably 
intends administrative deference in a wide array of statutory 
provisions. It is likely that Congress often means to grant agencies 
broad authority to do as they see best, within vaguely delineated 
guidelines. But often a statutory text results in ambiguity, and there 
is no evidence that Congress meant the ambiguity as any type of 
signal. More likely, the ambiguity was unintentional. In these 
circumstances, courts should distinguish between two concepts—
ambiguity and vagueness—concepts that courts have often conflated. 
II. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TYPES OF 
STATUTORY UNCERTAINTY 
When a court determines that a statutory provision is unclear, 
the Chevron doctrine insists on deference to the agency’s 
interpretation, if the interpretation is reasonable. But not every 
unclear statute suffers from the same malady. Yet, when reviewing 
agency interpretations of statutes, courts treat different types of 
uncertainty in statutory language as if they were equivalent. The 
Chevron opinion lumps all uncertainty into two categories: either the 
statute is silent on the issue or the text is ambiguous. If the provision 
falls into either of these categories, the question becomes “whether 
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the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”131 The Supreme Court consistently identifies all types of 
unclear statutory language as “ambiguous.”132 And, likely because 
the Supreme Court has never differentiated between ambiguity and 
vagueness, lower courts have also failed to do so. 
The problem, ironically, is that the word ambiguous is itself 
lexically ambiguous—that is, ambiguous has multiple meanings. 
Courts have used the term to refer to all uncertainty in written text, 
and thus when the Supreme Court directs lower courts to defer to 
agencies in the face of ambiguity, that includes all instances in which 
the meaning is unclear—in essence, whenever the question of 
statutory interpretation is difficult. But this Note uses the words 
ambiguity and ambiguous more technically and encourages courts to 
distinguish between different types of textual uncertainty. 
Consider the distinctness of two conceptually different cases that 
have come before the Court in the recent past. Most recently, the 
Court decided City of Arlington v. FCC, which involved the proper 
interpretation of a Communications Act provision requiring 
governments to act on applications “within a reasonable period of 
time after the request is duly filed.”133 While the question before the 
Supreme Court implicated subtler questions of jurisdiction, the 
Court held that it owed deference to the FCC’s interpretation of the 
provision since the agency determined that a reasonable time meant 
ninety days.134 Justice Scalia reasoned that the decision rested on a 
presumed congressional intent; “namely, ‘that Congress, when it left 
ambiguity in a statute’ administered by an agency, ‘understood that 
the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, 
and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever 
degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.’”135 The Court thought it 
 
 131.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 132.  See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 310 (2013) (describing a vague 
statutory language as “open ended—i.e. ‘ambiguous’”). 
 133.  Id. at 290 (emphasis added) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2012)). 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 296 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–
41 (1996)). 
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proper to let the agency determine what time period fell under the 
term reasonable.136 
Alternatively, in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 
the Court was called on to determine the correct interpretation of 
the term age in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA).137 The Court acknowledged that the ADEA “forbids 
discriminatory preference for the young over the old” but needed to 
decide “whether it prohibits favoring the old over the young.”138 In 
General Dynamics, a group of workers claimed “reverse age 
discrimination” before the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), and the agency agreed that the clause 
“because of [an] individual’s age” also included favoring the old over 
the young.139 This case was a pure question of statutory 
interpretation, distinguishing between two plausible meanings of 
age—one denoting old age and the alternative suggesting 
chronological age. 
Despite the difference between the provisions in the two cases, 
the Court analyzed the two under the same framework: the 
principles set out in Chevron.140 In the first instance, it is farcical that 
the Court could determine the singular meaning of a “reasonable 
period of time,” and therefore it is sensible to defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of the statute. By contrast, it is highly unlikely that 
Congress delegated to the EEOC the responsibility of determining 
whether the ADEA prohibited only traditional age discrimination 
(favoring the young over the old) or whether it prohibited all age 
discrimination. This is partly because the word age, while having two 
distinct senses, is capable of one singular meaning depending on the 
context. Congress could not have meant old age and chronological 
age concurrently, and therefore the provision had only one correct 
interpretation. The Court was essentially deciding which of the two 
meanings of door or bank Congress intended. 
 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004). 
 138.  Id. at 584. 
 139.  Id. at 585 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012)). 
 140.  Id. While it is true that the Court in General Dynamics did not ultimately apply 
Chevron because it found the statutory text to be clear, the Court nonetheless analyzed the 
cases under the Chevron two-step framework—rejecting Chevron deference at step one. 
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The Court would have been justified in rejecting Chevron 
deference in General Dynamics on the ground that the clause 
“because of [an] individual’s age,”141 though lexically ambiguous, has 
only a single meaning. It is simply impossible for the provision to 
protect only the old from discrimination while simultaneously 
protecting anyone regardless of age. 
Courts should distinguish between these two types of statutory 
uncertainty because failing to do so perpetuates the notion that 
Chevron rests upon a misguided fiction. Indeed, Congress does not 
always intend to delegate primary interpretive authority to agencies 
when the text is unclear. To more clearly understand when Congress 
is likely to delegate this authority to agencies and when it is less 
likely, it is helpful to understand the distinction between ambiguity 
and vagueness and the facets of each. 
A. Vagueness 
When the Court in Chevron described the statutory language as 
“ambiguous,” it should have characterized the lack of clarity as 
vagueness. But the Court’s incorrect description of the statutory 
terms does not come as a surprise because the two terms are often 
conflated and most people likely think first of vague terms when 
hearing that a statute is “ambiguous.” When a statutory provision is 
ambiguous, a disputed word or phrase has multiple distinct 
definitions (lexical ambiguity), or the structure of the sentence leaves 
the reader unclear as to how to interpret the provision 
(syntactic ambiguity). 
In contrast, a vague statute is one in which the issue is whether 
the actions of one party fall within the meaning of a particular 
term.142 Some vague words, for instance deictic words,143 offer little 
specificity and change their significance depending on the 
circumstance. What is “tall” in one circumstance may be quite 
 
 141.  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 
 142.  Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary defines the term as “not having 
a precise meaning” and “not sharply outlined.” Vague, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https:// 
www. merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vague (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). 
 143.  Examples of deictic words are this, that, me, and here, which change their 
significance depending on the context, such as the location or identify of the speaker. 
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different depending on the referent, whether the person is a child or 
a basketball player. An extremely tall child would be categorized as 
tiny for an NBA player. A “reasonable” time to wait would change 
significantly depending if the person were in a doctor’s office waiting 
room, measured in minutes or hours, or expecting a package to 
arrive after an online order, measured in days or weeks. It is not that 
words like tall and reasonable do not convey meaning. Each certainly 
expresses a concrete idea, but that idea often conveys a range whose 
exact boundaries are blurred. These examples are clearly vague, and 
it is highly likely that courts would defer to agencies on these types 
of questions even in the absence of a formal Chevron doctrine. 
Other types of vague terms are not so obviously indefinite, but 
the same principle applies. When a court must determine whether a 
particular object is excluded from the park as a “vehicle,” there are 
an innumerable number of objects that are obviously not vehicles. 
That is, the word vehicle is not completely indefinite: it conveys a 
relatively bounded meaning. But there are dozens of modes of 
transportation that might or might not be “vehicles” as expressed in 
the statute, depending on how broadly the court construes the term. 
To construe a vague term like vehicle, the court would be required to 
determine the core characteristics of a vehicle and to determine 
whether the alleged object shares enough of those characteristics to 
be considered a vehicle. This is a significantly different analysis from 
determining which of two distinct senses of bank operates in a 
specific statutory provision. 
Vague terms are “united as non-distinguished subcases of a 
single, more general meaning.”144 In other words, the term is 
characterized by the existence of borderline cases that do not clearly 
fall into the definition. As an illustration, the colors red and orange 
have recognized significance, meaning each has a core color. Nearly 
everyone would agree that a carrot is orange and a ripe strawberry is 
red. However, there are an infinite number of shades between these 
two colors. Since the line between where red ends and orange begins 
is fuzzy, likely evincing many opinions, these colors are vague. This is 
not to say that red and orange are meaningless terms or that no color 
 
 144.  David Tuggy, Ambiguity, Polysemy, and Vagueness, 4 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 273, 
273 (1993). 
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shade fits nicely within one categorization. But because there are 
clearly borderline cases, the color concepts themselves are 
somewhat vague. 
A recent, fairly run-of-the-mill case illustrates a vague term. In 
Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, the Court had to 
determine whether stormwater runoff from logging roads was 
“associated with industrial activity.”145 The Clean Water Act (CWA) 
requires potential polluters to secure permits before “pollutants are 
discharged into waters of the United States.”146 The CWA makes an 
exception for “discharges composed entirely of stormwater”147 unless 
the pollutant is “associated with industrial activity.”148 
While industrial activity is far from the vaguest term courts 
encounter, it remains true that the term is unclear. The manner in 
which the term is used has one general meaning, with both parties 
conceding that industrial activity relates to manufacturing or a 
similar activity. But there exist fringe cases in which one 
understanding of industrial activity might include logging activity 
and another understanding might exclude it. In such cases, the 
correct interpretation is more a matter of policymaking than textual 
interpretation. The surrounding text or other provisions might give 
more context and guidance, but the term itself yields little clarity. 
The phrase industrial activity is similar to the term vehicle, in 
that it is difficult to definitively say that a bicycle, for example, is a 
vehicle. Bicycles share many characteristics with automobiles, likely 
the quintessential vehicle, but they also have many differing 
characteristics. Similarly, logging shares many characteristics 
with  more quintessential industrial activities, like automobile 
manufacturing, but it also differs quite significantly. The term 
industrial activity, then, is vague, and the Court was correct in 
deferring to the agency. Purporting to interpret the term would be 
little more than judicial policymaking. 
 
 145.  Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013). 
 146.  Id. at 1331 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1) (2012) (substantially similar to the 
current 2017 version of the regulation)). 
 147.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(1) (2012). 
 148.  Id. § 1342(p)(2)(B). 
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Another example comes from the Chevron opinion itself. The 
Clean Air Act (CAA) imposes additional requirements on states that 
have not met the standards set by the EPA.149 One of these 
requirements is to establish a permit program regulating “new or 
modified major stationary sources.”150 The litigation arose over the 
proper interpretation of the term stationary source.151 One side read 
the term to refer to each physical structure that emitted pollution, 
and the other party interpreted it as referring to a “bubble” of 
several “pollution-emitting devices” within a single industrial 
plant.152 The phrase stationary source, left undefined by Congress, 
does not seem to give any guidance on the term. Congress 
understood that the EPA would likely promulgate regulations about 
what qualified as a major stationary source of pollution and did not 
deem it necessary to give clearer instructions. 
B. Ambiguity 
The two types of ambiguity are lexical and syntactic, and they 
both share similar properties. Ambiguity generally arises when a 
word or phrase has two or more plausible meanings and the context 
does not immediately make clear which meaning is intended. Most 
words in the English language have more than one meaning,153 and 
this creates ambiguity when the writer or speaker is not careful. 
1. Lexical ambiguity 
Lexical ambiguity is demonstrated by a popular joke: 
 
Tourist: What a lovely color that cow is! 
Farmer: It’s a Jersey. 
Tourist: Oh, I thought it was its skin.154 
 
 
 149.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  AITCHISON, supra note 23, at 174. 
 154.  Id. 
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The confusion—and humor—is derived from the two distinct 
meanings of jersey. As with bank, the word jersey has two distinct 
meanings that may cause confusion—one referencing a sports jersey 
and one referring to a breed of cow. But just because the word has 
more than a single sense does not mean that both the tourist and the 
farmer did not intend to convey a specific meaning. The farmer did 
not use the term jersey to refer to sports apparel just because the 
word has two plausible meanings. In a similar manner, an agency 
faced with an analogous question should not receive deference just 
because the word or phrase it purports to interpret has two 
plausible meanings. 
One way of understanding the issue of lexical ambiguity is to 
look at the debate among linguists about how word meanings are 
defined.155 Some linguists contend that words with numerous 
meanings have multiple senses.156 The words are the same, but the 
word bank has two distinct senses, a riverbank and a financial 
institution. Other linguists counter that these two meanings are 
actually different words that happen to have the same spelling.157 
This argument is easier to make with very distinct meanings, as with 
bank, and less persuasive with closely related meanings, as with door. 
Yet, one way to conceptualize how courts would identify lexical 
ambiguity is to view the two senses of door as separate words even 
though English speakers spell the words the same and often do not 
recognize the distinction until it is brought to their attention.158 
Consider a difficult case, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.159 
Saint Clair Adams signed an employment contract with his employer, 
Circuit City Stores, that required all claims against the company be 
brought to arbitration.160 The Federal Arbitration Act directs that 
these contractual arbitration clauses be enforced unless the contract 
 
 155.  See, e.g., Gillon, supra note 21, at 391–401; Adam Kilgarriff, “I Don’t Believe in 
Word Senses,” 31 COMPUTERS & HUMAN. 91 (1997). 
 156.  See Gillon, supra note 21, at 391–401. 
 157.  See Kilgarriff, supra note 155, at 91. 
 158.  See AITCHISON, supra note 23, at 253–55. 
 159.  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 160.  Id. 
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is one “of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”161  
The statute is clearly ambiguous because the phrase “foreign or 
interstate commerce” could have two distinct meanings.162 The 
clause could refer only to contracts of employees working in the 
transportation industry. This specific inclusion of “seamen” and 
“railroad employees” suggests such an interpretation. However, 
Congress also may have intended to include—in “any other class of 
workers”—any employee whose contract Congress could regulate 
under the Commerce Clause. Given the Supreme Court’s nearly 
boundless reading of the Commerce Clause, an employment 
contract with Circuit City would undoubtedly qualify. As one 
scholar  has remarked, “Who is right? As a linguistic matter 
both  understandings are plausible because the statute is 
[lexically] ambiguous.”163 
Congress cannot have written a statute that protects employees 
solely in the transportation industry and simultaneously protects any 
worker whose contract could be regulated. The latter category 
necessarily encompasses the former, thereby rendering void the 
statute’s exclusive function. Congress must have had one of the two 
meanings in mind. While the Circuit City case exemplifies a finer 
grained ambiguity than bank, the same principle holds true. Just as a 
court deciding between a statute that potentially regulates financial 
banks or riverbanks, courts should not defer to an administrative 
agency in cases of lexical ambiguity because the statutory provision 
permits a singular meaning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 161.  Id. at 112 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (substantially similar to the current 2012 
version of the statute)). 
 162.  See Lawrence M. Solan, Linguistic Issues in Statutory Interpretation, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 87 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan 
eds., 2012). 
 163.  Id. 
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2. Syntactic ambiguity 
Another type of ambiguity is syntactic or grammatical ambiguity, 
in which uncertainty arises from the grammatical structure of the 
sentence. Groucho Marx humorously remarked, “This morning I 
shot an elephant in my pajamas. How he got in my pajamas I don’t 
know.”164 The first sentence is syntactically ambiguous because, based 
on the structure of the sentence, it could convey that either Groucho 
or the elephant wore the pajamas.165 The most common syntactic 
ambiguity in statutes occurs when an adjective or adverb appears in a 
list but the text is unclear whether the descriptor modifies each item 
in the list or merely the adjacent item. 
The classic case of syntactic ambiguity is Liparota v. United 
States.166 In Liparota, the prosecution proved that a man had 
purchased food stamps from an undercover Department of 
Agriculture agent for significantly less than face value.167 The statute 
the prosecution relied upon read that “whoever knowingly uses, 
transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards 
in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations” is 
criminally liable.168 The government argued that “knowingly” did 
not modify all parts of the clause, and thus the prosecution had to 
prove only that the individual knew that he possessed (illegal) food 
stamps.169 Alternatively, the defendant pressed for a different reading, 
arguing that he had to know that possessing unauthorized food 
stamps was illegal.170 The grammatical structure of the text creates 
plausible linguistic interpretations for both sides. 
Another example comes from a jury instruction providing that a 
person may be convicted of conspiracy if the individual “was aware 
of the common purpose, had knowledge that the conspiracy existed, 
or was aware of the conspiracy from its beginning.”171 The D.C. 
 
 164.  DEBRA AARONS, JOKES AND THE LINGUISTIC MIND 131 (2012). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
 167.  Id. at 421–23. 
 168.  Id. at 420. 
 169.  Id. at 423. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). 
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Circuit found syntactic ambiguity in the instruction because it was 
not entirely clear whether “from its beginning” modified all three 
clauses or simply the final one.172 The structure of the sentence 
obscured the relationship between the clauses and created 
uncertainty regarding the correct interpretation. 
When either type of ambiguity, lexical and syntactic, occurs in a 
statute, there exist at least two plausible interpretations. Once a 
court determines which meaning is correct, however, all other 
meanings are necessarily deemed incorrect and the analysis is 
complete. With lexical ambiguity, for instance, a word might have 
several recognized senses, but each sense has a reasonably bounded 
meaning. Once the court has disposed of the legal question by 
determining the correct interpretation, the only remaining issues are 
questions of fact regarding whether the particular situation falls into 
the category defined by the word sense. 
Thus, not all unclear statutory provisions are cut from the same 
cloth. Simply because a statute is not straightforward and clear, 
courts should not automatically assume that Congress left the 
question open for an agency to determine. Some provisions are 
tremendously ambiguous, but if a court is merely deciding which of 
two or more meanings of a word applies, it should not defer. As 
demonstrated in the following Part, Congress is unlikely to 
have  intended administrative deference when it drafts, often 
unintentionally, statutes that contain lexical or syntactic ambiguities. 
III. JUSTIFYING THE AMBIGUITY EXCEPTION 
In distinguishing between ambiguous and vague statutory 
provisions, courts would not alter their analysis as much as it might 
seem. This Note encourages courts to determine whether Congress 
intended a specific meaning for a given provision, which, if so, courts 
are then obligated to enforce. The change in the Chevron doctrine 
would be in how the court determines whether Congress provided an 
answer to statutory uncertainty: instead of analyzing the clarity of 
the provision, courts ought to analyze whether the provision, as 
 
 172.  Id. at 1510 (noting that the jurors could have “resolve[d] the syntactic ambiguity 
in the disputed sentence by concluding that ‘in the beginning’ modifies only the last and not 
the first two verb phrases”). 
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written, has one specific meaning or whether Congress merely set 
out guidelines, even if fairly specific ones. This forms the basis of the 
distinction between ambiguous and vague provisions, respectively. 
When a provision has one specific meaning (ambiguity), the court 
would choose which definition of a multi-sense word applies—that 
is, it would simply resolve a question of pure statutory construction.  
The current Chevron doctrine encompasses one part of the 
analysis: if the provision is clear, the court infers that there is a 
singular meaning that courts may deduce from the statute’s 
language.173 But courts are missing a key element: many statutes are 
genuinely ambiguous but nonetheless capable of no more than one 
plausible meaning, such as age discrimination. This is not to say that 
the words themselves have only one singular definition (bank has at 
least two), but that the provision cannot bear both meanings 
simultaneously. A provision relating to banks cannot plausibly 
simultaneously regulate both financial institutions and waterways. 
(By contrast, a vague provision relating to vehicles in the park could 
plausibly regulate both cars and motorcycles.) Courts, as opposed to 
agencies, ought to be the primary interpreters of these 
ambiguous provisions. 
A. Deference for Ambiguity Does Not Square with 
Congressional Intent 
Courts should not defer when faced with ambiguous provisions 
because the reasons the Supreme Court has provided for 
administrative deference do not apply to ambiguous provisions. As 
already noted, Professors Gluck and Bressman’s study concluded that 
ambiguity in statutes does not automatically indicate Congress’s 
intention to delegate to an agency.174 Congressional drafters noted 
that “although ambiguity sometimes signals intent to delegate, often 
it does not.”175 If the lack of clarity does not always signify 
Congress’s objective that agencies assume primary interpretive 
 
 173.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984). 
 174.  Gluck & Bressman, supra note 93, at 996; see also supra notes 101–03 and 
accompanying text. 
 175.  Gluck & Bressman, supra note 93, at 996. 
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responsibilities, which imprecise provisions does Congress intend 
courts to interpret without agency deference?  
This Part contends that lexical and syntactic ambiguities are the 
best candidates for judicial interpretation. Congress is unlikely to 
intend that primary interpretive authority rests with an agency in the 
face of lexical or syntactic ambiguity for two reasons. First, statutory 
ambiguity is often unintentional, and, second, an incorrect decision 
regarding which definition operates results in a fundamental change 
to the statute rather than a decision regarding the statute’s 
applicability to the pertinent issue. 
Lexical and syntactic ambiguities are most often unintentional. 
The Gluck and Bressman study confirms that Congress often tries to 
be clear and specific,176 but despite its best efforts, ambiguities in 
statutes remain. This is because ambiguities are sometimes difficult 
to identify, especially for the one drafting the statute. Since the girl 
saying, “I saw a man with a telescope” knows she was looking 
through her own telescope, it is probable she would not recognize 
the possibility that a listener might think she spotted a man holding 
his telescope.177 
Indeed, researchers have concluded that when a person confronts 
an ambiguous text, with one word or phrase having multiple 
meanings, the subconscious mind weighs the different meanings and 
determines the most likely.178 The brain has the capacity to 
subconsciously consider multiple meanings without alerting the 
conscious brain to the fact that an ambiguity exists.179 In other 
words, many people who are presented with ambiguous sentences 
seem to understand the sentence without ever noticing the 
ambiguity.180 If native speakers of a language often do not 
consciously recognize the potential ambiguity in sentences, this 
 
 176.  Id. (“The presumption is broad deference, so we try to be clear when we 
want otherwise.”). 
 177.  See FROMKIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 176–77. The professors use and diagram the 
sentence “The boy saw the man with a telescope” and explain that “[i]t is ambiguous because 
it can mean that the boy saw the man by using a telescope or that the boy saw the man who 
was holding a telescope. The sentence is structurally ambiguous because it is associated with 
two different phrase structures, each corresponding to a different meaning.” Id. 
 178.  AITCHISON, supra note 23, at 253–55 (summarizing the results of several studies). 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. 
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would not allow congressional drafters to weigh how another person 
would likely interpret the provision. 
It follows that if there is no congressional recognition of an 
ambiguity, there can be no congressional intent to establish an 
ambiguity. Unless Congress has a meta-intent that agencies should 
be the primary interpreters of all ambiguities, it cannot possibly 
intend an unrecognized ambiguity to signal anything to agencies or 
courts. This is simply because there cannot be intent where there is 
no recognition. Thus, courts cannot infer that Congress intends all 
unrecognized ambiguities to signal deference because, as scholars 
have concluded, Congress does not possess a meta-intent that all 
ambiguities be resolved at the agency level.181 
Although Congress likely does not recognize many statutory 
ambiguities, this does not signal that Congress does not intend to 
ascribe a specific meaning to the provisions. Ambiguous words or 
phrases have one singular meaning in the sense that they cannot bear 
more than one meaning at a time, and therefore members of 
Congress must have thought the provision meant one of multiple 
meanings. The provision possessed a finite meaning when drafted, 
and by not recognizing an alternative interpretation, Congress could 
not have shown an actual intent for that ambiguity to be resolved by 
a specific entity—agency or court.182 
Further, when interpreting lexical and syntactic ambiguities, 
courts and agencies do more than merely fill in the details. They 
fundamentally characterize the nature of the statute. It is true that 
interpreting some—perhaps even the vast majority of—ambiguities 
will not completely alter the entire statutory scheme, but each 
ambiguity defines the statute in a manner such that if a court or 
 
 181.  See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 93, at 996. 
 182.  The reasoning stands true regardless of whether one believes that the language itself 
possesses a finite meaning or whether one believes that Congress had a finite meaning in mind 
when it drafted the statute (in other words, whether one is a textualist or intentionalist). When 
a statute cannot regulate two situations simultaneously—such as traditional age discrimination 
or reverse age discrimination—the provision must have one singular meaning. In other words, 
the textual language must be interpreted in one single manner to be consistent (the statute 
cannot regulate both), and Congress was highly unlikely to have intended both meanings—
each founded in distinct policy considerations—because such a provision would essentially be 
leaving the statute’s most fundamental feature for an agency to determine. 
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agency interprets it incorrectly, it directly contradicts the meaning 
the provision originally bore. 
For instance, returning to the example of General Dynamics, 
Congress passed the ADEA, which prohibited discrimination 
“because of [an] individual’s age.”183 This statute proved an instance 
of genuine ambiguity, and both the majority and dissent had 
convincing arguments regarding which interpretation was proper. 
Thus, the current Chevron doctrine would instruct the court to defer 
to the EEOC’s interpretation. However, it is highly unlikely that 
members of Congress did not understand whether the statute 
protected solely against discrimination against the elderly or 
protected against reverse discrimination. If an agency or court 
interpreted the ambiguity in a way that Congress did not intend, the 
result would go beyond simply filling in details—it would directly 
contradict the statutory meaning. 
This analysis does not apply to vague provisions, however, 
because vague words and phrases, in the strict sense, have indefinite 
meanings. This leads to less certainty that Congress ever considered 
the question presented to the court. As with Professor Hart’s 
hypothetical, even if the hypothetical legislative body could agree on 
a core purpose for prohibiting vehicles in the park, individual 
members would likely disagree on an exhaustive list of prohibited 
vehicles. This is also illustrated by Decker.184 Industrial activity has a 
core significance, meaning that members of Congress could surely 
agree on many activities that would not qualify. But, it is also highly 
probable that if each member of Congress attempted to provide an 
exhaustive list of applicable activities, each of the 535 lists would 
differ, many in significant ways. If Congress paused to consider the 
term, it would recognize the need for someone down the line to add 
substance to the concept. Congress would also likely recognize that 
as new industries emerge with new technologies, some governmental 
 
 183.  Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586 (2004) (citing 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000) (substantially similar to the current 2012 version of the statute)). 
 184. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1326 (2013). 
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entity will need to determine the statute’s applicability to an industry 
to which Congress could not have had a specific intent.185 
Consequently, ambiguous provisions are distinct from vague 
provisions, and congressional intent likely differs with respect to 
each. Deferring to an agency to interpret a lexically or syntactically 
ambiguous provision would potentially allow that agency to change 
the effect of a statute when Congress did not even recognize the 
existence of an ambiguity in the first instance. 
B. Deference for Ambiguity Is Not Supported by Alternative Theories 
Congressional intent to delegate primary interpretive authority 
to agencies for unclear statutes is not the only rationale for 
administrative deference. Scholars have contended that policy 
considerations also suggest that courts ought to defer.186 The most 
persuasive of these rationales are expertise and accountability. First, 
agencies have the necessary expertise courts lack to understand how 
to implement congressional statutes.187  Second, executive agencies 
are more politically accountable than unelected, lifetime-tenured 
judges.188 For these reasons, scholars contend, courts should defer to 
agencies when a statute is unclear.189 As this section argues, agency 
expertise and accountability do not apply with the same force, and 
are in fact rather weak justifications, when applied to courts’ 
interpreting lexical and syntactic ambiguities. But before elaborating 
on this position, it is worth explaining how these two rationales 
apply with compelling force to interpreting vague provisions. 
Chevron deference is appropriate in instances of vagueness 
because vague terms possess no singular, definite meaning, leaving 
whichever institution that interprets the statute to act in the role of 
policymaker. Chevron instructs courts, during step one, to use the 
 
 185.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9–10 
(1994) (“Over time, the gaps and ambiguities proliferate as society changes, adapts to the 
statute, and generates new variations on the problem initially targeted by the statute.”). 
 186.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 
2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 421 (2013) [hereinafter Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain]. 
 187.  Id. at 423. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
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traditional theories of statutory interpretation to determine “[i]f the 
intent of Congress is clear.”190 This step, in essence, is a search for 
meaning. Depending on their preferred theory of statutory 
interpretation, judges approach this step differently. Intentionalist or 
purposivist judges attempt to find the legislative purpose behind the 
statute. These judges argue that courts ought to find meaning based 
on the legislative purpose because “[l]imits on human foresight, 
imprecision in the tools of linguistic expression, and constraints on 
legislative resources contribute to the production of generally 
worded texts that could not possibly capture the variety of situations 
that lie ahead.”191 Thus, they conclude, since the words do not 
necessarily guide a judge to the correct answer, a court should resort 
to interpreting the words in light “of policies that serve some 
overarching purpose.”192 Despite a court’s attempt to find the 
general—and some would say abstract—purpose, the purposivist 
remains intent on “construct[ing] a meaning for statutory text on 
the assumption that the text has one right answer.”193 
Textualist judges approach the problem from a distinct 
perspective “in part because they hold different pictures about 
legislative behavior.”194 They believe that ambiguity arises because 
“legislators cut deals to obtain consensus, and awkward words reflect 
those deals.”195 Thus, to give effect to those legislative deals, 
“[m]odern textualists adhere to the ordinary meaning of those 
words to give effect to whatever deal they may manifest.”196 In doing 
this, these judges seek to find the statute’s one singular meaning, 
confident that a careful analysis of the text will reveal the 
correct interpretation. 
Chevron, then, is likely the result of the recognition that both 
these theories of interpretation are not wholly effective in every 
 
 190.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 191.  John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2010 (2006) (describing Justice Stevens’s theory of 
statutory interpretation). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 6, at 564. 
 194.  Id. at 559. 
 195.  Id. at 560. 
 196.  Id. 
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circumstance. Judge Laurence Silberman once wrote that Chevron 
was created because, even when “one is scrupulously honest in 
reading a statute thoroughly and looking carefully at its linguistic 
structure,” statutory provisions often are genuinely ambiguous, 
“giv[ing] room for differing good-faith interpretations.”197 In other 
words, when a statute does not make clear that Congress intended a 
specific meaning, Chevron should apply to ensure the “avoidance of 
judicial policy making” because “the executive[] has a greater claim 
to make policy choices than the judiciary.”198 No judge, no matter 
how intelligent or ingenious, can find a singular meaning where 
none exists. To quote Gertrude Stein, no matter how carefully one 
scrutinizes the text or legislative history of some statutory provisions, 
“there is no there there.”199 
When judges interpret a vague statute to have a specific meaning 
when there is none, they are effectively engaging in policymaking. 
This is clearly inconsistent with the founders’ view of the judiciary as 
the “least dangerous” branch.200 For this reason, Judge Silberman 
wrote that the Chevron doctrine, in certain circumstances, “more 
appropriately than any other [doctrine], serves to distinguish those 
who advocate judicial restraint, who stand, if you will, for a little 
judiciary, from those who hold a countervailing view.”201 
But these arguments do not apply with equal force to statutory 
provisions that are either lexically or syntactically ambiguous. 
Indeed, when a court encounters a genuine ambiguity, no matter 
how difficult, and that ambiguity has a singular meaning, the 
judiciary has a greater claim to interpretation than the executive 
branch. The usual responses of superior agency expertise or greater 
democratic accountability fall short. 
Supported by the Chevron opinion itself, scholars have long 
contended that agencies ought to resolve questions of statutory 
interpretation because agencies possess “greater ‘expertise’ than 
 
 197.  Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 821, 826 (1990). 
 198.  Id. at 822. 
 199.  GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (Vintage Books 
1973) (1937). 
 200.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Glazier & Co. ed., 1826). 
 201.  Silberman, supra note 197, at 821–22. 
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courts in figuring out instrumental applications.”202 One reason that 
agencies may enjoy more expertise in the subject area than courts is 
that agencies are specialized.203 “[A]gency officials spend their time 
focusing on a particular set of problems, . . . they have thought 
about them more, they have seen what works and what does not 
work, and they are sharply aware of the practical trade-offs that are 
needed given the scarce resources for implementation.”204 
Another rationale for courts to defer to administrative agencies is 
increased political accountability. As noted, Chevron reasoned that 
“[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political 
branch of the Government to make such policy choices.”205 Indeed, 
as Judge Easterbrook has observed, there is a difference between 
Article III judges and agency officers.206 “The difference is tenure. 
When judges make policy . . . you can’t get rid of them. In a 
representative democracy, that is a powerful reason not to allow 
judges to make policy in the first place.”207 He continues that these 
reasons are “especially true in a nation such as ours whose political 
system is designed to make it very hard to enact legislation that 
changes judicial decisions.”208 
These prudential arguments make it apparent that courts need to 
determine whether the statute has a discernable meaning because 
agencies should have primary interpretive authority when the statute 
is vague, so long as that interpretation is permissible. But when the 
statutory provision contains lexical or syntactic ambiguities, an 
agency’s subject-matter expertise and political accountability are no 
longer relevant. 
While agencies may understand the practical tradeoffs of various 
alternatives or prove more politically discerning, courts are experts in 
interpreting the law. Judges have more experience in parsing legal 
 
 202.  Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain, supra note 186, at 421. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 206.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. 
REV. 1 (2004). 
 207.  Id. at 9. 
 208.  Id. 
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texts than do agency officials, as judges perform these functions on a 
daily basis. District court judges defer to the judgments of juries in 
fact questions and appellate judges give deference for the same to 
trial court findings. But neither defers to any other when analyzing 
questions of law, especially statutory interpretation, because judges 
are the presumed experts in this field. 
Additionally, judges are not under the same political pressures as 
agency officials and are in a better position to find the correct textual 
meaning of the statute rather than to use the text as a means to 
an  end. Indeed, as one scholar has noted, many “[s]ensitive 
questions  of  agency statutory interpretation” are decided 
by  “political  appointees . . . rather than agency specialists.”209 Even 
when “experts” determine the meaning of a statute, critics have long 
contended that “‘expertise’ cannot be exercised objectively and 
instead simply masks value-laden policy decisions.”210 
Professor Eskridge has also acknowledged that agencies cannot 
always be counted on to follow the best reading of the text.211 He 
has noted that “virtually anyone who has had experience in actual 
administration agrees that even well-motivated agencies engage in 
what economists would call ‘shirking,’ namely, departing from the 
(majoritarian) agenda set for the agency by Congress.”212 Professor 
Eskridge has identified two types of “shirking.”213 First, agencies 
shirk their rule of law duties by “press[ing] statutory policy beyond 
the established meaning of the statute” because agency officials “get 
caught up in the normative bounce that comes from aggressively 
pursuing the agency’s mission.”214 Second, an agency shirks its 
democratic duties by “mak[ing] a major policy move on its own, 
 
 209.  Criddle, supra note 36, at 1287–88. 
 210.  Id. at 1287; see also Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2135 (2002) (“[T]he legal realists’ hope that legal ambiguities 
could be resolved by objective policy expertise has long ago grown quaint. . . . In practice, it is 
rare to find a field of social policy where there are not experts on opposing sides of an issue . . . 
undermining any claim to an objective expert resolution.”); Richard B. Stewart, The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1683–87 (1975). 
 211.  Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain, supra note 186, at 433. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. at 434. 
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without sufficient mooring in a congressional authorization.”215 In 
contrast, judges are disinterested and are not charged with furthering 
any agency’s mission; thus, judges are in a better position than are 
agency officials to find the meaning of an ambiguous statute when 
the statutory provision has a specific meaning. 
Agency policy judgments are not necessarily harmful, especially 
when exercised in the face of a vague statute, but executive 
policymaking has no place when Congress has already made the 
decision. This necessarily negates the democratic accountability 
rationale because, even setting aside the power-allocating provisions 
of the Constitution, Congress holds much greater political 
accountability than do agencies. When a statute has a singular 
meaning, regardless of whether Congress used ambiguous words or 
gave the provision an ambiguous construction, Congress has made 
the decision and agencies must follow. No matter how much more 
politically accountable agencies are than courts, when Congress 
regulates a financial bank by using the word bank, the agency cannot 
construe that term to refer to riverbanks, no matter how plausible 
the interpretation. 
In instances of lexical and syntactic ambiguity, the question no 
longer becomes which institution, agency, or court, has thought 
more about the policy or practical implications of the statute, as 
scholars have suggested. Rather, the question becomes which 
institution is best situated to determine the law, to determine the 
meaning of provisions that Congress has passed and the president 
has signed. 
Moreover, courts should not defer to agencies’ interpretations of 
lexically and syntactically ambiguous provisions because, under 
Chevron, agencies’ interpretations get upheld unless they are 
unreasonable, even if they are not the best interpretation of the 
statute. This point is crucial because the Chevron doctrine does 
analytical work only when the court would have ruled against the 
agency but defers instead. A court would have no need of a 
deference doctrine if its interpretation is identical to that of the 
agency. Courts, then, should not defer to agencies when it appears 
that there is one correct answer because the court, without a 
 
 215.  Id. at 436. 
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deference doctrine, must pick the best interpretation rather than 
simply sanction a plausible one. Returning to the example of General 
Dynamics, both interpretations of age—old age and chronological 
age—were plausible, but Congress undoubtedly intended only one 
of those meanings.216  
If agencies receive administrative deference for questions such as 
the one posed in General Dynamics, and an agency interprets a 
provision incorrectly despite the preponderance of evidence pointing 
toward the opposite answer, then the court would be obligated to 
side with the agency’s incorrect interpretation merely because both 
interpretations were plausible or permissible. This, however, can be 
avoided. Requiring courts to determine the meaning of lexical and 
structural ambiguities would increase the likelihood that statutes will 
be interpreted as Congress intended. 
For vague statutes, on the other hand, agencies are in the best 
position to formulate policy because they possess superior expertise 
in formulating policy and are more politically accountable than 
courts.217 When the text of the statute has a singular but ambiguous 
meaning, however, courts are preferable to agencies in determining 
the correct interpretation because courts possess superior expertise in 
interpreting texts, and because courts, being disinterested third 
parties, are less prone to the political pressure to interpret statutes in 
a plausible but incorrect manner. Moreover, creating a Chevron 
exception for lexical and syntactic ambiguities will empower 
courts  to honor congressional intent by freeing them from the 
obligation  to  defer to agencies’ plausible though ultimately 
incorrect interpretations. 
I acknowledge that distinguishing statutory provisions on 
whether they are vague or ambiguous has its downsides. For 
instance, lower courts might have difficulty in applying the “pure 
questions” doctrine with complete accuracy, as has occurred with 
 
 216.  Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 581 (2004). 
 217.  This is true unless, of course, Congress or the Constitution requires the judicial 
branch to determine all questions of statutory interpretation, as has been argued persuasively 
by many scholars. Yet, as a matter of pure institutional structure, agencies are better equipped 
to answer policy questions because of their greater expertise and political accountability. This is 
not true, however, when a court is tasked not with developing policy but determining the 
policy that Congress has already established. 
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Mead.218 But, as one distinguished scholar has noted, “no theory 
based on legislative intent to delegate will yield a simple rule. 
Ultimately, simplicity is not the sole benchmark for evaluating any 
interpretive theory. An acceptable theory should reflect a reasonable 
balance among the various goals . . . .”219 In the end, the distinction 
proposed here may be partially based on a legal fiction that courts 
may not apply with perfect accuracy and consistency. However, the 
proposed method will track congressional intent and textual cues 
more accurately than the legal fiction upon which Chevron is 
currently based—namely, that Congress intends agencies to act as 
the primary interpretive authority for virtually all unclear statutes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The fact that implied congressional intent is the basis for Chevron 
has significant implications for administrative deference. Namely, 
courts cannot simply presume that Congress intends any and all 
unclear statutes to signal deference to administrative agencies.  
Instead, courts must make an inquiry into whether that 
assumption remains true in each particular circumstance. 
Consequently, the Chevron framework, from the outset, asks the 
wrong question. By requiring courts to care only about whether the 
statute is clear, as the current Chevron doctrine demands, it obligates 
them to ignore the fact that Congress writes many statutory 
provisions that have a specific yet ambiguous meaning even though 
Congress would not likely wish those statutes to be interpreted 
under the merely permissible construction standard. Thus, 
instinctively deferring to an agency in the face of every textual 
uncertainty undermines congressional intent. Instead of inquiring 
whether the statute is clear, courts should determine whether 
Congress intended courts to defer to an agency on the question at 
issue, even if doing so is difficult to definitively ascertain in any 
particular circumstance. 
 
 218.  See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1446–81 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the 
Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003) (showing the difficulty the D.C. Circuit has had 
in applying Mead). 
 219.  Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 6, at 557. 
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The Chevron doctrine could significantly improve how effectively 
it shadows Congress’s wishes, and it could do so if courts decline to 
defer to agency interpretations when faced with pure questions of 
statutory interpretation. Courts can recognize pure questions by 
distinguishing between two types of statutory uncertainty, vagueness 
and ambiguity, two concepts the Supreme Court has thus far 
conflated. When a court is faced with a lexical or syntactic 
ambiguity—meaning that the court must determine which of two or 
more meanings of a disputed term or phrase applies—the court 
should not defer to the agency. Instead, courts should embrace their 
responsibility as experts in interpreting the law because, when a 
provision is ambiguous rather than vague, Congress would prefer 
courts to follow the best reading of the words it enacted rather than 
following an agency’s permissible construction. 
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